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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine founding a company that revolutionizes the way people enjoy 
professional sports.1 Then, after seven years of being in business, the company 
has yet to achieve profitability, due in large part to the exorbitant legal expenses 
required to lobby for and defend the legality of the company’s nascent industry.2 
Consequently, to help ensure the survival of the company, you do the 
unthinkable—agree to merge with your bitter rival.3 
This was the situation confronting FanDuel, a major daily fantasy sports 
(“DFS”) company, in November 2016 when it announced an agreement to merge 
with DraftKings (the “Merger”).4 Pending regulatory approval from the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), the companies expected to 
consummate the Merger by the end of 2017.5 Ultimately, FanDuel and 
DraftKings never received that approval.6 Instead, the FTC elected to challenge 
the Merger due to competition concerns.7 As a result, in July 2017, FanDuel and 
DraftKings decided to terminate their pursuit of a merger, rather than spend 
 
1.  See generally About, FANDUEL, https://www.fanduel.com/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the founding of FanDuel). 
2.  See Darren Heitner, How and Why FanDuel and DraftKings Decided to Merge, FORBES (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2016/11/18/how-and-why-fanduel-and-draftkings-decided-
to-merge/#340fa7687c45 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (revealing that FanDuel 
“spent almost $8 million in legal fees” during the fourth quarter of 2015). 
3.  See David Purdum, Planned Merger Between DraftKings, FanDuel Is Off, ESPN (July 14, 2017), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/20002903/in-abrupt-fashion-draftkings-fanduel-merger-off (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (questioning “whether both DraftKings and FanDuel can survive as 
separate entities”). 
4.  Id. 
5.  Heitner, supra note 2. 
6.  Purdum, supra note 3. 
7.  Id. 
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upwards of $15 million on another legal battle.8 
The FTC and some industry commentators view this result as “a major win 
for daily fantasy sports consumers.”9 This Comment, however, argues that 
critical flaws in the FTC’s analysis not only led to an incorrect decision to 
challenge the Merger, but also demonstrate the need to consider revising the 
Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”).10 The Guidelines 
are the analytical framework the FTC uses to determine whether to challenge a 
particular horizontal merger.11 The FTC should revise the Guidelines because, as 
the DraftKings and FanDuel experience reveals, the FTC may not be 
accomplishing its “mission to protect consumers and promote competition” as 
effectively as it otherwise could, which has far-reaching implications for 
consumers and industries across the country.12 
Part II discusses the FTC’s authority to review horizontal mergers and the 
Guidelines.13 Part III examines the administrative complaint the FTC filed 
challenging the proposed Merger.14 Part IV analyzes the critical flaws in the 
FTC’s rationale for contesting the Merger, which led the FTC to unnecessarily 
challenge the Merger.15 Finally, Part V offers potential revisions to the 
Guidelines that will address the shortcomings of the current version of the 
Guidelines.16 The Guidelines must be reevaluated in light of the FTC’s analytical 
missteps with the Merger.17 
II. THE REFEREE AND RULEBOOK FOR REVIEWING HORIZONTAL MERGERS 
Before discussing the particulars of the failed Merger, this Comment 
explores the relevant regulatory framework for reviewing horizontal mergers in 
the United States.18 Section A describes the FTC’s statutory authorization to 
 
8.  Id. 
9.  Marc Edelman, FTC Challenges Proposed DraftKings and FanDuel Merger: A Win for Daily Fantasy 
Consumers, FORBES (June 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2017/06/19/ftc-challenges-
proposed-draftkings-and-fanduel-merger-a-win-for-daily-fantasy-consumers/#241e0acb4698 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
10.  Infra Parts IV–V. 
11.  DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES] 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 7, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13.  Infra Part II. 
14.  Infra Part III. 
15.  Infra Part IV. 
16.  Infra Part V. 
17.  Infra Parts IV–V. 
18.  Infra Part II. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also plays an 
important role in “enforc[ing] the federal antitrust laws,” but, because the FTC handled the investigation into 
the proposed Merger, this Comment does not address the DOJ’s role in reviewing mergers. The Enforcers, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last 
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review horizontal mergers.19 Section B discusses the FTC’s Guidelines for 
challenging a horizontal merger.20 
A. The Referee: The Federal Trade Commission’s Authority to Review 
Horizontal Mergers 
The FTC challenged the proposed Merger pursuant to the authority vested in 
the FTC by the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC 
Act”).21 The Clayton Act proscribes corporate acquisitions that are likely to result 
in substantially less competitive markets.22 The statute vests the authority to 
enforce this provision in the FTC.23 If the FTC determines that a proposed 
merger is inconsistent with the Clayton Act and the merging companies refuse to 
abandon the merger, the FTC may challenge the merger by “issu[ing] an 
administrative complaint and/or seek[ing] injunctive relief in the federal 
courts.”24 
The FTC Act expands the Commission’s authority by allowing it “to address 
acts or practices that are anticompetitive but may not fall within the scope of 
the . . . Clayton Act.”25 The FTC Act declares that “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce” are unlawful, and empowers the FTC to 
ensure corporations do not engage in such conduct.26 If the Commission believes 
a proposed merger would violate the FTC Act, it may initiate an administrative 
adjudicatory action under the FTC Act.27 The adjudicatory proceedings under the 
FTC Act parallel the proceedings initiated under the Clayton Act.28 Enforcing 
these statutes helps the Commission achieve its goal of “ensur[ing] that 
[American] markets are open and free” and “work[] according to consumer 
preferences, not illegal practices.”29 
 
visited Nov. 7, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
19.  Infra Part II.A. 
20.  Infra Part II.B. 
21.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 45 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72). 
22.  Id. 
23.  15 U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72). 
24.  The Enforcers, supra note 18. 
25.  Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of 
Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 13, 2015), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
26.  15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72). 
27.  A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
28.  Id. 
29.  What We Do, supra note 12. 
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B. The Rulebook: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The Guidelines reflect “the principal analytical techniques and the main 
types of evidence on which the [FTC] usually rel[ies] to predict whether a 
horizontal merger may substantially lessen competition.”30 Thus, the Guidelines 
are key to the FTC’s merger review process.31 If, according to the Guidelines, a 
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, the FTC will almost certainly 
challenge the merger.32 
This Section generally describes portions of the Guidelines that appeared 
prominently in the FTC’s decision to challenge the Merger.33 Subsection 1 
discusses how the Guidelines approach product market definition and how this 
affects the market concentration analysis.34 Subsection 2 focuses on potential 
anticompetitive effects mergers have on customers and industries.35 Subsection 3 
explores how market entry can mitigate a merger’s anticompetitive effects.36 
Finally, Subsection 4 explains how the FTC could be persuaded to approve a 
merger if the merging firms can substantiate cognizable efficiencies that will 
result from the merger.37 
1. Product Market Definition and Market Concentration 
Defining the relevant product market is an important function of the 
Guidelines because it “allows the [FTC] to identify market participants and 
measure market shares and market concentration.”38 The analysis concentrates on 
demand substitution factors.39 In other words, the analysis seeks to identify 
“customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to 
another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such 
as a reduction in product quality or service.”40 The FTC engages with customers 
to ensure it properly defines the product market, as “[c]ustomers are typically the 
best source . . . of critical information on the factors that govern their ability and 
 
30.  GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1. 
31.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRANSCRIPT OF THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT 15 
(Dec. 3, 2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/horizontal-merger-
guidelines-review-project/091203transcript.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT TRANSCRIPT] (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Robert Pitofsky, former Chairman of the FTC, asserted the 
Guidelines have “had the most important influence on American antitrust policy in the last 50 years.” Id. 
32.  15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72). 
33.  Infra Part II.B. 
34.  Infra Part II.B.1. 
35.  Infra Part II.B.2. 
36.  Infra Part II.B.3. 
37.  Infra Part II.B.4. 
38.  See GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the important reasons behind market definition). 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
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willingness to substitute in the event of a price increase.”41 
The FTC applies the hypothetical monopolist test to accurately establish the 
relevant product market.42 This test “requires that a product market contain 
enough substitute products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of 
market power significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger.”43 The test 
safeguards against defining a relevant product market too narrowly.44 
Defining the relevant product market is important because it allows the FTC 
to undertake a market concentration analysis.45 The FTC’s calculation of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) often sheds light on a merger’s likely 
competitive effects.46 The Commission calculates the HHI “by summing the 
squares of the individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately 
greater weight to the larger market shares.”47 As part of this analysis, the FTC 
“consider[s] both the post-merger level of market concentration and the change 
in concentration resulting from a merger.”48 
In some instances, the HHI calculation carries significant weight.49 If the 
FTC concludes “the post-merger level of the HHI and the increase in the HHI 
resulting from the merger” are sufficiently high, the FTC will declare the merger 
to be presumptively illegal.50 Mergers that result in a post-merger HHI level 
above 2,500 and “an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points” are 
presumptively illegal.51 Despite this presumption, the Guidelines state that “[t]he 
purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate 
competitively benign mergers from anticompetitive ones.”52 Instead, the 
Commission intends for the HHI calculation to be “one way to identify some 
mergers unlikely to raise competitive concerns and some others for which it is 
particularly important to examine whether other competitive factors confirm, 
reinforce, or counteract the potentially harmful effects of increased 
concentration.”53 For these reasons, defining the product market and measuring 
market concentration are critical aspects of the Guidelines.54 
 
41.  DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
9 (2006), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/commentaryonthehoriz 
ontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
42.  GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
43.  Id. at 9. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. at 7. 
46.  Id. at 18. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 19. 
50.  Id.; Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), 
at *8. 
51.  GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 19. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
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2. Anticompetitive Effects 
When two competing firms merge, “[t]he elimination of competition between 
[them] that results from their merger may alone constitute a substantial lessening 
of competition.”55 The Guidelines term this result as a merger’s “unilateral 
effects,” which can take various forms.56 For example, a merger “may diminish 
competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price 
of one or both products above the pre-merger level.”57 Reduced competition also 
may incentivize a “merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level 
that would prevail in the absence of the merger.”58 A merged firm, for example, 
may have “reduced incentive to continue with an existing product-development 
effort or reduced incentive to initiate development of new products.”59 Finally, a 
merger could lead to less product variety.60 This lack of product variety could be 
harmful to consumers if the merged firm removes products most consumers 
strongly prefer to what would remain available in the marketplace.61 If the FTC 
believes any of these harmful unilateral effects are likely to result from a 
merger’s substantial reduction in competition, the FTC will likely challenge the 
merger.62 
3. Market Entry 
The Guidelines also recognize that “[t]he prospect of entry into the relevant 
market will alleviate concerns about adverse competitive effects[, but] only if 
such entry will deter or counteract any competitive effects of concern so the 
merger will not substantially harm consumers.”63 To determine if market entry 
may counteract anticompetitive effects, the FTC analyzes the “timeliness, 
likelihood, and sufficiency of the entry efforts an entrant might practically 
employ.”64 Entry is timely if it is “rapid enough that customers are not 
significantly harmed by the merger, despite any anticompetitive harm that occurs 
prior to the entry.”65 The Guidelines also indicate that “[e]ntry is likely if it 
would be profitable, accounting for the assets, capabilities, and capital needed 
and the risks involved, including the need for the entrant to incur costs that would 
 
55.  Id. at 20. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. at 23. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 24. 
61.  Id. 
62.  15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72). 
63.  GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 28. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 29. 
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not be recovered if the entrant later exits.”66 Finally, entry is sufficient if it is 
capable of counterbalancing a merger’s anticompetitive effects.67 
As part of its market entry analysis, the FTC “consider[s] the actual history 
of entry into the relevant market and give[s] substantial weight to this 
evidence.”68 This history is important because a “[l]ack of successful and 
effective entry in the face of non-transitory increases in the margins earned on 
products in the relevant market tends to suggest that successful entry is slow or 
difficult.”69 The Guidelines recognize that obtaining accurate and thorough 
information may be extremely difficult and, therefore, “the [FTC] consider[s] 
reasonably available and reliable evidence bearing on whether entry will satisfy 
the conditions of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency.”70 
4. Efficiencies 
Finally, the Guidelines recognize that mergers have the “potential to generate 
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive 
to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced 
service, or new products.”71 While recognizing this potential, however, the 
Guidelines assert that “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify,” and 
“credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed 
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed 
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects.”72 The 
Commission places the burden “upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency 
claims so that [the Commission] can verify by reasonable means the likelihood 
and magnitude of each asserted efficiency.”73 Further, the merging firms must 
demonstrate “how and when each [efficiency] would be achieved (and any costs 
of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to 
compete, and why each would be merger-specific.”74 
In the end, the Guidelines play a key role in antitrust law enforcement.75 Not 
only do the Guidelines anchor the FTC’s merger analysis and enforcement, they 
also serve the important purpose of “provid[ing] greater transparency and 
foster[ing] deeper understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement.”76 For 
these reasons, the effectiveness of the FTC’s merger enforcement and the welfare 
 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 28. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at 29. 
72.  Id. at 30. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  See GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT TRANSCRIPT, supra note 31, at 15. 
76.  GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1. 
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of American businesses and consumers hinge on the soundness of the 
Guidelines.77 
III. BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S COMPLAINT 
AGAINST THE DRAFTKINGS AND FANDUEL MERGER 
On June 19, 2017, the Commission filed an administrative complaint to 
challenge the Merger.78 The following Sections describe the FTC’s main reasons 
for challenging the Merger.79 Section A discusses how the FTC defined the 
relevant product market DraftKings and FanDuel compete in.80 Section B 
explores the FTC’s finding that the Merger, if consummated, would have 
significant anticompetitive effects.81 Finally, Section C describes the 
Commission’s determination that there were no countervailing factors to 
convince the Commission to approve the Merger.82 
A.  Defining the Relevant Product Market 
The FTC determined that paid DFS is “a distinct relevant product market” 
and used this as support for its decision to challenge the Merger.83 The 
Commission reached this conclusion because it found important distinctions 
between paid DFS and other types of fantasy sports, such as season long fantasy 
sports (“SLFS”).84 For example, according to the FTC, DFS and SLFS are 
different because DFS contests have a much shorter duration.85 Additionally, the 
two contests are different because “SLFS participants play primarily for social 
reasons,” while the opportunity for financial gain motivates DFS participants.86 
Finally, DFS and SLFS generally have different contest sizes because, unlike 
DFS contests, SLFS games do not allow an athlete to appear on multiple teams at 
the same time.87 For these reasons, the FTC concluded SLFS contests “are not 
sufficiently substitutable to belong in a paid DFS relevant product market.”88 
Based on this conclusion, the FTC excluded SLFS from its market 
 
77.  Id. 
78.  Press Release, FTC and Two State Attorneys General Challenge Proposed Merger of the Two 
Largest Daily Fantasy Sports Sites, DraftKings and FanDuel, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/06/ftc-two-state-attorneys-general-challenge-proposed-
merger-two (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
79.  Infra Part III.A–C. 
80.  Infra Part III.A. 
81.  Infra Part III.B. 
82.  Infra Part III.C. 
83.  Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at *5. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at *6. 
88.  Id. at *5. 
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concentration analysis.89 As a result, the Commission determined that the Merger 
would lead to a highly concentrated DFS market.90 The Commission calculated 
that “the Merger would result in a post-Merger HHI of at least 8,100 and an 
increase in concentration much greater than 200 points.”91 These HHI levels 
prompted the Commission to declare the Merger presumptively unlawful.92 
B. The Merger’s Anticompetitive Effects 
The FTC also found that the Merger would have significant anticompetitive 
effects.93 For example, the Commission believed approving the Merger would 
result in “higher commission rates and lower promotional offers.”94  According 
to the Commission, this would occur because DraftKings currently serves as an 
important constraint on FanDuel’s ability to raise prices, and vice versa.95 The 
FTC reasoned that this price competition would no longer exist after the Merger, 
leading to higher prices for customers.96 
Additionally, the FTC contended the Merger would eliminate non-price 
competition.97 As separate entities, DraftKings and FanDuel compete on non-
price factors such as contest size, product features, and sports offerings.98 If the 
FTC allowed the companies to merge, the merged company “would have 
significantly less incentive to maintain and to improve the quality of its contest 
offerings and user experience.”99 From the Commission’s perspective, this 
reduction in product quality and incentive to innovate would harm consumers, 
making this an important anticompetitive effect of the Merger.100 
C. Lack of Countervailing Factors 
Finally, the Commission asserted there were no countervailing factors that 
would counterbalance the Merger’s anticompetitive effects.101 For example, the 
FTC contended new entrants into the paid DFS market would be unlikely 
because of significant barriers to entry, such as regulatory uncertainty and 
 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at *7. 
91.  Id. at *8. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at *8–9. 
94.  Id. at *8. 
95.  Id. at *9. 
96.  Id. at *10. 
97.  Id. at *2. 
98.  Id. at *10. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at *12. 
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compliance costs.102 Additionally, the FTC found that the Merger created no 
cognizable efficiencies “that rebut the strong presumption and evidence that the 
Merger likely would substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.”103 
The FTC also concluded neither DraftKings nor FanDuel is in danger of going 
out of business, which would have militated in favor of approving the Merger.104 
Because the Commission found no factors that would counteract the Merger’s 
significant anticompetitive effects, it filed an administrative complaint to 
challenge the Merger.105 
IV. REVIEWING THE CALL ON THE COURT: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 
ANALYTICAL MISSTEPS 
The FTC insists it is protecting American consumers by challenging the 
Merger, and some industry experts have commended the FTC for its actions.106 
After further review, there are numerous flaws in the Commission’s analysis of 
the Merger.107 These flaws played an important role in the FTC’s decision to 
challenge the Merger, and analyzing them reveals the FTC should not have 
challenged the Merger.108 Section A argues the FTC mischaracterized the 
relevant product market, leading it to overstate the Merger’s anticompetitive 
effects and incorrectly apply the presumption of illegality.109 Section B describes 
the important countervailing factors the FTC dismissed when analyzing the 
Merger.110 
A. Mischaracterizing the Relevant Product Market 
The FTC determined the differences between DFS and SLFS are sufficient to 
make paid DFS “a distinct relevant product market.”111 With the exclusion of 
SLFS, the Commission mischaracterized the relevant product market because the 
differences between the two are not as significant as the Commission asserts.112 
First, the FTC contends the markets are different because DFS players primarily 
 
102.  Id. at *13. 
103.  Id. at *14. 
104.  Id. at *13. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Edelman, supra note 9. 
107.  Infra Part IV.A–B. 
108.  Infra Part IV.A–B. 
109.  Infra Part IV.A. 
110.  Infra Part IV.B. 
111.  Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at 
*5. 
112.  FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, ONE-DAY VS. SEASON-LONG FANTASY PLAYERS: IS THERE 
A DIFFERENCE? 10 (2015), available at http://www.fstaconference.com/docs/09-McClain-Eggles-
Demographics.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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participate to win money, while SLFS users play to interact with friends.113 This 
argument distinguishes between the markets by overstating the importance of 
financial gain to DFS players and understating the importance to SLFS users.114 
Industry data demonstrates the opportunity for financial gain is not the primary 
motivation for most DFS players.115 In one study, for example, only 13.3% of 
DFS players stated profit is the main reason for playing DFS.116 Rather than 
profit, many DFS players reported excitement, competition, and strategy as being 
primary motivators for engaging in DFS.117 
Industry data also demonstrates that the FTC overlooked the importance of 
financial gain to SLFS users.118 For example, 43% of SLFS players list financial 
gain as one of the reasons for playing SLFS.119  Additionally, industry data from 
2016 reveals that the average SLFS player spent $184 on SLFS over a one-year 
period.120 While this trails the $318 an average DFS player spent on his or her 
games over the same time period, the spending on SLFS and motivation to win 
money are not insignificant.121 Thus, the DFS and SLFS markets are more similar 
than different because the opportunity for financial gain is an important 
motivation for players in both markets.122 
Additionally, the Commission insisted that the DFS and SLFS markets are 
distinct because not many DFS players are interested in playing SLFS.123 
According to the FTC, “most DFS users are not likely to turn to SLFS as a 
substitute product in response to a small but significant price increase.”124 Once 
again, industry data refutes this claim.125 An industry study found 82.8% of DFS 
users also play traditional SLFS, meaning the two contests frequently compete 
for the same consumers.126 As a result, SLFS and DFS consumers are not as 
different as the Commission argues.127 
The companies’ decisions to begin offering games that closely resemble 
traditional SLFS offerings further complicate the decision to label DraftKings 
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and FanDuel as pure DFS providers.128 Since 2016, DraftKings and FanDuel 
have offered “Leagues” and “Friends Mode,” respectively.129 These features 
“give[] users the ability to play against a single group of friends all season long” 
and demonstrate a clear “foray into the . . . season-long market.”130 Because 
DraftKings and FanDuel both offer competitions that directly compete with 
traditional SLFS, the argument that these companies operate in a separate DFS 
market loses force.131 
In the end, the differences between DFS and SLFS are not as drastic as the 
FTC suggests.132 Therefore, the Commission erred when it concluded SLFS are 
not a part of the DFS market for merger analysis purposes.133 As a result of this 
mistake, the FTC defined the relevant product market too narrowly.134 This led 
the FTC to incorrectly conclude the Merger would result in a highly concentrated 
market, triggering the presumption of illegality.135 This critical mistake is 
evidence that the Guidelines are implicating mergers that should be left 
unchallenged, which means the Guidelines are not serving their purpose and need 
to be revised.136 
B. Dismissing Important Countervailing Factors 
The Commission also ignored significant countervailing factors that militate 
against challenging the Merger.137 Subsection 1 explains how the Merger would 
have eliminated regulatory uncertainty in the DFS industry, thereby making entry 
into the market more likely.138 Subsection 2 describes how the Merger would 
have generated significant cost-saving efficiencies consumers likely would have 
benefitted from.139 
1. The Merger Would Have Eliminated the Regulatory Uncertainty Barrier 
to Entry 
The FTC found entry into the DFS market would not “be timely, likely, and 
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sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the Merger.”140 The FTC 
reasoned that high regulatory compliance costs and significant regulatory 
uncertainty in the industry made market entry an inadequate offset.141 As a 
consequence of blocking the Merger, however, the FTC entrenched uncertainty 
in the DFS industry because DraftKings and FanDuel cannot effectively 
collaborate on lobbying for industry regulations as separate entities.142 Without 
synergy and collaboration between these companies on this issue, alleviating the 
regulatory uncertainty in the industry becomes much less likely, which 
discourages prospective firms from entering the market.143 
On the other hand, if the Commission had approved the Merger, it would 
have helped eliminate the industry’s regulatory uncertainty, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of market entry and fostering a more competitive environment.144 
The Merger would have created a more stable regulatory environment because 
the merged firm would be able to “work more efficiently and economically with 
state government officials to develop a standard regulatory framework for the 
industry.”145 The major motivations behind the proposed Merger were reducing 
compliance costs and creating a consistent regulatory framework, so eliminating 
regulatory uncertainty would have been a likely result of the Merger.146 
Finalizing a regulatory framework would have reduced the legal and lobbying 
expenses that have had a debilitating effect on each company’s bottom line.147 
Assuming a merged DraftKings and FanDuel would accomplish its goal of 
eliminating regulatory uncertainty and reducing compliance costs, all other firms 
in the DFS market would benefit from a more stable and attractive regulatory 
environment.148 This attractive environment would encourage prospective firms 
to enter the industry, creating a more competitive marketplace.149 The FTC 
ensured hostility to market entrants by blocking the Merger, whereas approving 
the Merger would have fostered a more competitive environment by eliminating 
the most significant barrier to entry.150 
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2. The Merger Would Have Created Cost-Saving Efficiencies 
The FTC also contended there were no cognizable efficiencies that would 
counterbalance the Merger’s anticompetitive effects.151 However, a merged 
DraftKings and FanDuel would likely enjoy enormous cost savings, which is a 
significant efficiency.152 As separate entities, DraftKings and FanDuel are 
“doubling the resources spent on legal battles” and advertising.153 For example, 
in 2015, DraftKings and FanDuel spent a combined $500 million on 
advertising.154 While both companies have reduced their advertising budgets 
since, the Merger would have allowed the combined company to decrease 
advertising expenditures even further.155 Similarly, as separate firms, DraftKings 
and FanDuel have redundant legal and lobbying expenses.156 A merged company 
would eliminate redundant costs and allow for more efficient work with 
government officials.157 
DraftKings and FanDuel ultimately pass their significant advertising and 
legal costs on to consumers.158 Therefore, consumers would likely benefit from 
the merged firm’s ability to reduce costs.159 The merged company may try to 
retain all cost savings to increase profits, but some benefits would likely extend 
to consumers as well.160 For example, cost savings could benefit consumers by 
making DFS contests cheaper for players.161 Additionally, the increased 
likelihood of market entry after the Merger could incentivize the merged 
company to invest its cost savings in product innovation.162 
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Thus, the Commission appears to have ignored a significant efficiency that 
would counteract the anticompetitive effects of the Merger by dismissing the 
Merger’s ability to reduce fixed costs.163 Rather than leading to higher prices and 
reduced innovation, the Merger likely would have benefitted consumers because 
the merged firm could have realized hundreds of millions of dollars in cost 
savings.164 
V. CHANGING THE GAME: REVISING THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
The numerous missteps in the FTC’s analysis of the Merger indicate the 
necessity of revising the Guidelines.165 Revisions will help the FTC more 
effectively carry out its mandate to ensure markets remain competitive, enforce 
antitrust laws, and promote consumer welfare.166 Further, these revisions will 
help prevent the Commission from unnecessarily challenging harmless merger 
proposals in the future.167 Section A proposes leveling the burden of proof for 
merger efficiencies.168 Section B suggests the Guidelines should acknowledge 
that consumers benefit from a merged firm’s fixed cost savings.169 Section C 
recommends removing innovation from the competitive effects analysis.170 
Section D advocates eliminating the presumption of illegality from the 
Guidelines.171 
A. Leveling the Burden of Proof for Merger Efficiency Claims 
One way to improve the effectiveness of the Guidelines is to level the burden 
of proof for merger efficiency claims.172 Currently, the Guidelines do not provide 
for a difference between the burden of proof required to establish efficiency 
claims or anticompetitive effects.173 In reality, however, the Commission’s 
“investigating attorneys appear more skeptical of efficiency claims than they do 
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of potential anticompetitive effect claims.”174 Additionally, the Guidelines 
require merging firms to prove efficiency claims in great detail.175 In contrast, the 
FTC does not have to precisely substantiate anticompetitive effects because the 
Guidelines state “that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom 
possible.”176 This distinction implicitly suggests there is a higher burden of proof 
for efficiency claims.177 
The FTC should revise its Guidelines to “explicitly reject different burdens 
of proof for procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.”178 Doing so would 
promote more consistent application of the Guidelines and encourage the 
Commission to more seriously consider efficiency claims, rather than quickly 
and skeptically dismiss them.179 
B. Acknowledging Fixed Cost Reductions Benefit Consumers 
The FTC should also revise the Guidelines to more fully address fixed cost 
savings as cognizable efficiencies consumers benefit from.180 Currently, the FTC 
limits its discussion of fixed cost savings as efficiencies to a skeptical footnote in 
the Guidelines.181 The Merger would have resulted in considerable savings on 
advertising and legal expenses, yet the FTC did not recognize the savings as a 
cognizable efficiency in its complaint.182 The Commission likely did not 
recognize the cost savings as a cognizable efficiency because the Guidelines 
currently state that “[e]fficiencies relating to costs that are fixed in the short term 
are unlikely to benefit customers in the short term.”183 The FTC “normally 
give[s] the most weight to the results . . . over the short term.”184 Many 
companies, however, establish their price structures using their total costs, which 
include fixed costs.185 This means that when fixed costs decrease for these 
companies, prices will as well.186 As a result, the FTC should reconsider its 
position in the Guidelines that efficiency claims based on fixed costs savings are 
not entitled to much weight.187 
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Even if there are few industry competitors remaining after a merger, a 
merged firm is still likely to pass some of its fixed cost savings along to 
consumers.188 Therefore, concerns that a concentrated marketplace will prevent 
consumers from enjoying lower prices generated by a merged firm’s fixed cost 
savings should not keep the FTC from adopting this revision.189 
Adopting this revision would better align the Guidelines with the 
Commission’s actual practices.190 In practice, the FTC is “as likely to accept 
fixed-cost savings as [it is] to accept claims of variable-cost savings.”191 This 
demonstrates a significant disconnect between the Guidelines and actual FTC 
practices.192 Because of this disconnect, discerning how the FTC will evaluate the 
fixed cost savings that result from a merger becomes much more difficult.193 
When such a disconnect exists, the Guidelines cease to achieve one of their 
primary goals—providing transparent FTC antitrust enforcement.194 For these 
reasons, the FTC should more receptively address claims of fixed cost savings as 
cognizable efficiencies by revising the Guidelines.195 
C. Removing the Effect on Innovation from the Competitive Effects Analysis 
Removing the innovation analysis could also increase the Guidelines’ 
effectiveness.196 Currently, the Guidelines recognize that reduced innovation 
could be an anticompetitive effect of a merger and that increased innovation 
could also be an efficiency resulting from a merger.197 Determining a merger’s 
effect on innovation can be extremely difficult because “the competition-
innovation link is neither settled nor supportive of a causal relationship between 
the number of firms and amount of (successful) innovation.”198 It is unclear how 
an industry’s competitive environment affects a firm’s ability and incentive to 
innovate.199 
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Further, the FTC lacks experience with evaluating innovation.200 The 
experience the FTC does have “derive[s] from investigations of mergers in the 
pharmaceutical industry,” which may not be helpful when analyzing a merger’s 
effect on innovation in other industries.201 With the limited knowledge of a 
merger’s effect on innovation and the Commission’s inexperience with analyzing 
innovation, the Commission should revise the Guidelines to remove the 
innovation analysis.202 
D. Eliminating the Presumption of Illegality 
Finally, eliminating the presumption of illegality for mergers reaching 
specific HHI thresholds could help the Guidelines become more effective and 
transparent.203 The presumption of illegality is problematic for multiple 
reasons.204 First, HHI scores derive directly from product market definition.205 
The powerful effect of a presumption of illegality thus forces the merging parties 
and the FTC to dedicate too much effort to defining the relevant product 
market.206 As a result, the merging parties and the FTC may lose focus on 
analyzing other specific circumstances that shed light on a particular merger’s 
likely competitive effects.207 The presumption of illegality has a significant 
unintended consequence of distorting the breadth and depth of merger analysis.208 
Additionally, similar to efficiency claims for fixed cost savings, the 
Commission’s practice regarding the presumption of illegality has not always 
aligned with the Guidelines.209 This divergence between agency practice and the 
Guidelines leads to confusion for businesses and makes the Guidelines less 
transparent.210 Therefore, removing the presumption of illegality from the 
Guidelines and agency practice will improve consistency and provide greater 
clarity to merging companies.211 
Further, the presumption of illegality compounds the burden of proof 
problem that permeates the Guidelines.212 Already having the burden to prove 
merger efficiencies in great detail, merging parties must rebut the presumption of 
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illegality “by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance 
market power.”213 As a result, after the FTC proves that a merger would reach the 
appropriate HHI thresholds, the merging parties have the burden to prove the 
merger’s efficiencies and disprove its anticompetitive effects.214 The presumption 
of illegality places an enormous burden on the merging parties.215 
In the end, the Commission should revise the Guidelines to eliminate the 
presumption of illegality when mergers reach certain HHI levels.216 The 
Guidelines should only indicate that when a merger attains a particular HHI 
threshold, the FTC will engage in a more detailed investigation into the merger’s 
likely competitive effects.217 Such a revision will ensure the Commission engages 
in “a more direct analysis of likely competitive effects” that could result from a 
merger.218 Even with this revision, the HHI can continue “provid[ing] substantial 
guidance as highly useful screens.”219 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The FTC’s decision to challenge the DraftKings and FanDuel merger directly 
impacts roughly three million active players on these sites and leaves the future 
of these companies and the DFS industry in doubt.220 Ultimately, one of these 
companies may go out of business, which would produce the exact monopoly in 
the DFS industry the Commission argued it avoided creating by challenging the 
Merger.221 Consumers should have significant concerns about their ability to 
enjoy DFS games in the future.222 
The implications of the Commission’s decision to block the Merger extend 
far beyond the DFS industry.223 If the current version of the Guidelines led the 
FTC to unnecessarily block the Merger, the Guidelines could likewise direct the 
FTC to needlessly challenge other mergers in the future.224 When the 
Commission challenges mergers it should actually approve, the Commission is 
not effectively carrying out the mandates established in the FTC Act and the 
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Clayton Act.225 Instead, the FTC causes the exact harm these laws entrust the 
FTC to prevent.226 
For these reasons, the failed DraftKings and FanDuel merger is an important 
signal that it is time to revise the Guidelines once again.227  Simple revisions like 
leveling the burden of proof for the FTC and merging parties and eliminating the 
presumption of illegality can make the Guidelines and antitrust enforcement 
more effective.228 Similarly, removing innovation from the competitive effects 
analysis and fully recognizing fixed cost savings as a cognizable efficiency can 
improve the Guidelines.229 By taking these steps, the Commission can ensure it is 
protecting consumers, being transparent with businesses, and minimizing its 
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